that local governments may pursue various goals is implicit in analyses of local fiscal variables which assume that the values of these variables are dependent on or influenced by the process of collective choice; the characteristics of the decisive voter(s) as well as the nature and institutional form of local governments are presumed to matter.4
At the national level, it is often argued that competition via the electoral process leaves the bureaucrat considerable latitude because voters have limited incentive to learn about candidates or to vote their preferences. At the local level, however, it has been argued that competition among jurisdictions restricts a bureaucrat's ability to pursue policies which do not reflect the residents' desires. In fact, Tiebout (1956) argued that jurisdictional competition would guarantee the same efficiency in the provision of local public goods that competition among firms assures in private goods markets. Tiebout's argument thus appears to imply that the ballot box is unnecessary, that efficient provision of local public services will arise because residents can vote with their feet. If, in fact, jurisdictional competition leads to efficient local goods provision, then analyses of the political choice process would appear to be applicable primarily in those cases in which the relevant set of jurisdictions is small.
In a recent article, Courant, Gramlich, and Rubinfeld (1979) study the choice of fiscal variables by a local government that has been captured by its bureaucracy. Their analysis, which focuses upon decision making in a single jurisdiction, investigates the extent to which the ability of residents to leave the jurisdiction limits the power of its bureaucracy. Their paper provides an interesting analysis of the trade-off faced by a public employees' union in a single jurisdiction whose residents are mobile.
Our analysis focuses on the equilibrium among jurisdictions. We seek to determine how changing the number of jurisdictions (i.e., changing the degree of competition among jurisdictions) constrains tax and expenditure policies of individual governments. We posit alternative assumptions about governmental objectives to examine the consequences of jurisdictional competition.5
In particular, we question whether competition among a large number of jurisdictions forces governments to implement policies that are in the best interests of their residents. To answer this question, we deliberately consider a rather extreme version of government entrenchment. The government (the mayor, the bureaucracy, or however defined) in each jurisdiction is assumed to choose a tax rate and level of government spending to maximize government profit. The government is limited in its choice of tax instruments by a constitution over which it has no control, but there is no political mechanism by which residents can affect the tax rate or the level of government spending. Residents can, however, move freely among jurisdictions. We do not claim that local governments actually maximize profits; we do not wish to argue that local governments are entrenched and unresponsive to their electorates. Resident voters, via intrajurisdictional processes, may indeed restrain governmental behavior to be in accord with their own desires. Without denying this possibility, this paper addresses the question of whether interjurisdictional competition can, in itself, accomplish the same end. Although increasing the number of jurisdictions reduces each government's ability to levy taxes in excess of expenditures, we demonstrate that competition among jurisdictions, even with very many jurisdictions, is not sufficient to prevent individual governments from pursuing policies which are not in the interests of their residents. We thus demonstrate that the right of citizens to choose among many communities cannot completely eliminate governmental monopoly power; that is, competition among governments is not equivalent to competition among firms. A further implication is that the political choice process can matter.
The above results are established in a model in which every government seeks to maximize governmental profit and in which each jurisdiction is equivalent in size and location. Once this result has been established, it is natural to ask whether governments in different jurisdictions can coexist while pursuing different objectives. This question is answered affirmatively even when the number of jurisdictions is very large. In answering this question, we shed additional light on the "capitalization hypothesis" and further clarify the interpretation of tests of the Tiebout hypothesis. Finally, we explain what would happen if all jurisdictions were not homogeneous in size or locational desirability or both. One of the implications is that the presence of a large number of jurisdictions in one portion of the metropolitan area, say, the suburbs, limits the monopoly power of jurisdictions in that portion of the metropolitan area but has little effect on the monopoly power of jurisdictions in other portions of the metropolitan area, say, the central city.
In the section which follows, the model is introduced and some comparative statics are derived for use in the subsequent sections. In Section III, governments are assumed to maximize profits, and the implications of jurisdictional competition are examined. The consequences of jurisdictional competition when objectives differ among governments are examined in Section IV. In Section V we investigate the case in which jurisdictions of differing size occupy differing portions of the metropolitan area. A summary and conclusions are presented in Section VI.
II. Equilibrium with Multiple Jurisdictions6
In a metropolitan area with homogeneous individuals each of whom can freely choose the jurisdiction in which he wishes to reside, no jurisdiction can unilaterally create a level of well-being for its residents different from that available to residents of the remaining jurisdictions (assuming more than one). If, for instance, one jurisdiction chooses a fiscal package (i.e., tax rate and level of government services) which residents find relatively unattractive, they will respond by moving to other jurisdictions. As a result of this movement, housing prices adjust to compensate for differences in the desirability of fiscal packages. In this section, we will set forth more exactly the implications of this assumption that individuals can choose their residential location. The primary purpose of this section is to derive properties of the equilibrium. These properties are used in the analyses in subsequent sections. The analyses in this and the following section are kept relatively simple by the assumption that all jurisdictions are alike both in terms of their natural physical amenities and in terms of their fiscal variables.
Consider, therefore, a metropolitan area with a fixed total land area, L, in which there are J jurisdictions.7 The land area is divided equally among the jurisdictions, so that each has a fixed boundary encompassing land area L = LIJ. Housing is produced by competitive firms in the jurisdiction from land and nonland factors via a constant-returns neoclassical production function. The price of nonland factors is assumed fixed and uniform throughout the metropolitan area. The housing-supply function in the jth jurisdiction can then be written as:8 Hi = Lhi (PA),(1 6 In this and subsequent sections of the paper, we assume an equilibrium exists and we investigate the properties of the equilibrium. 7 In Sec. V we show that our results are not changed qualitatively if it is assumed that additional land is available at the urban fringe.
8 The housing-supply function is obtained by assuming that housing producers choose the ratio of nonland to land inputs to maximize profits. The production function is assumed to exhibit constant returns to scale. The ratio of nonland to land inputs will be an increasing function of the price of housing, and it follows that the amount of housing supplied per unit of land will increase as the price of housing increases.
where Pp is the price of housing in the jth jurisdiction and hi is the supply function of housing per unit of land.
The jurisdiction supplies Gi units of a local public good; each resident is assumed to receive an equal nonshared amount. The good is produced with constant returns to scale from nonland factors, and its unit cost will be taken as unity. Thus, the total cost of the good is proportional to the number of residents. The jurisdiction finances this good by assessment of a flat rate property tax, ti, on the market value of housing in the jurisdiction. Determination of the levels of Gi and ti will be discussed in the following sections.
There 
Note that hd expresses housing demanded per person, unlike hs, which expresses housing supplied per unit of land. Each individual is free to move among jurisdictions, and his locational choice is that which maximizes his utility. In equilibrium, no individual has an incentive to move. Thus, utility must be the same in all jurisdictions:
All Ni individuals in each jurisdiction must be housed, so
and all individuals in the metropolitan area must live in some jurisdiction, N = Z Ni.
j=i Conditions (5) and (6) can be combined to yield:
We will assume that the government of each jurisdiction, whatever its objective, adopts a Cournot-Nash strategy, choosing its Gi and tj treating all other jurisdictions' choices of G and t as parameters (i.e., no attempt will be made to investigate strategies in which one government attempts to determine how changes in its tax rate or service level will affect the choice of tax rates or service levels in other jurisdictions). In the remainder of this section, we derive the comparative static response of P]1 and Nj in each jurisdiction when tk and Gk are varied in any one jurisdiction. For notational convenience, we will denote jurisdiction 1 (i.e., k = 1) as the jurisdiction whose tax and spending levels are perturbed.9
If jurisdiction 1 differentially changes its tax rate while no other fiscal parameter is altered, individuals would move into or out of jurisdiction 1 and out of or into the remaining J -1 jurisdictions. Changes in housing prices will ensure that equilibrium, as described by conditions (4) and (7), is restored. Consequently, totally differentiating (4) and (7), we obtain the response of prices to a change in t1.
-Ujshd(1 + t1)dPh + U4Bhj (I + ti)dP]1 = U I hdPIdt 1,j 1.0 (8a)
In order to simplify notation, for each jurisdiction, let qrj represent the elasticity of housing demand with respect to the gross-of-tax price 9Technically, this model is not "closed" for two reasons. First, land has a positive price in all jurisdictions and the return on land wealth has not been included as income to consumers. Second, if the government obtains tax revenue in excess of expenditures, the profit should be counted as income to some agent. Formally incorporating these elements requires dealing with wealth effects-which are a nuisance and do not shed any light on the issues of interest to us. The return on land wealth could be incorporated in one of two ways. Title to land could be created with each consumer-resident endowed with shares valued at I/Nth of the aggregate value of the land in the metropolitan area. This would not change our analysis or our results in any essential respect. Alternatively, the utility function of consumers could be assumed to display a constant marginal utility of the numeraire commodity, i.e., to be of the form U W(G,h) + B. With this utility function, variations in wealth arising either from changes in land value or from profits in the government sector would not affect the equilibrium in the market for housing within or across jurisdictions. The fact that wealth effects can be introduced in these ways without affecting our qualitative results reinforces our assertion that they can be assumed away. While closing the model by one or more of the devices mentioned above may be an appealing formalism, the added complexity adds cumbersome detail without in any way illuminating the issues being addressed.
10 Inl obtaining (8a) from (4), we have made use of eq. (2). Note that (4) and (2) together imply that the direct utility function evaluated at the optimum choice of housing must be equal across jurisdictions. Hence we simply use the envelope theorem, that residents' housing demand optimally adjusts to the new gross-of-tax price of housing, P,1(1 + t), in each community. of housing (-q < 0), let O6 represent the elasticity of housing supply with respect to the net-of-tax price of housing (0 > 0), and let yj represent the elasticity of housing demand with respect to government services. In addition, let &i represent the functionally determined density of population.
Since in this section all governments are assumed to behave identically and adopt the same strategy and all governments and residents are identical, we assume that all governments will adopt the same G and t in equilibrium. Thus, when t' is perturbed, dp2 = . . . = dP{1, and the levels of all endogenous variables are the same in all jurisdictions. Using these conditions and the elasticities and ratio defined above, we may rewrite equations (8) It is apparent from (9a) that an increase in the number of jurisdictions increases the sensitivity of Ph to changes in t'; that is, as J increases, dPh/d1t becomes more negative, and in the limit as] -s o it approaches -PH!( 1 + t). This implies that in the limit the derivative of the gross-of-tax price, d[Ph(I + tl)]/dt', approaches zero, so that any change in t1 is fully offset by a change in PH. As the number of jurisdictions becomes large, the price in other jurisdictions is unaffected by changes in t0, as is seen by taking the limit of (9b) as] -> x.
Under our simplifying assumption of identical governments and residents, the comparative static effects on housing prices caused by a change in GI can be derived in the same manner as the effects caused by changes in tP. These comparative statics are: consumer-which in turn causes Pj to be bidden Up.12 The terms in (1Ob) are interpreted similarly.
As the number of jurisdictions increases, equation (lOb) indicates that the effects of changes in GC on prices in other jurisdictions go to zero. AsJ -x 00, equation (1Oa) shows that any rise in G' will be offset by a rise in PI to keep the consumer-resident's utility constant.
The effects of changes in t' and G' on the population in jurisdiction 1, N', are derived by differentiation of (5) and by use of the results in (9) and (10). Performing the necessary differentiation and substitutions yields:
These results are easily summarized. An increase in the tax rate causes a decline in the jurisdiction's population because the fall in the equilibrium net-of-tax price (see [9a]) causes a reduction in housing supply. By contrast, a rise in government services makes the jurisdiction more attractive. As a consequence, the population of the jurisdiction will rise, except in the case where complementarity of housing and government services causes an increase in per capita housing demand large enough to offset the decline in per capita demand that results from the price increase exhibited in (1Oa). It should be emphasized that the comparative static results derived above do not depend on any particular objective function for the jurisdictions. They simply characterize an equilibrium in which identical jurisdictions pursue identical Cournot-Nash strategies. They can thus be used to investigate governmental objectives such as maximization of property values, the utility of the median voter, government expenditure, or "government profit."
III. Profit-maximizing Government
In this section we assume that each jurisdiction is controlled by a monopolist whose objective is to maximize governmental profit, defined here as the excess of tax revenue over government expenditure. We will neither defend nor deny the realism of this governmental objective; this choice of extreme objective is simply a convenient vehicle for determining whether jurisdictional competition can eliminate the power of local governments to adopt policies which are not in the best interests of their residents. In practice, voting by residents might prevent such exercise of monopoly power. However, our purpose is to determine whether competition among jurisdictions is by itself sufficient to prevent the exercise of governmental power. Hence, we deliberately assume that the monopolist can set G and t without electoral approval.
Profit to the government of the representative jurisdiction is:13
Superscripts have been dropped since all jurisdictions are identical. Differentiating (12) and using (1) t)J From (14b) it is apparent that the marginal rate of substitution of government services for numeraire goods departs from the ratio of relative prices (which equals one). However, because of the distortion that arises from the property tax on housing, even a welfaremaximizing government would choose a level of public good supply such that the marginal rate of substitution does not equal the price ratio.
From (14a), it is clear, unlike the Cournot result when the number of firms is increased, that government monopoly profits are positive even when the number of jurisdictions is large. Tax revenue per capital, tPHhd, exceeds government spending per capital, G, by a posi-tive amount, related to the value of housing per capita, PHhd, and to the housing-supply elasticity, 0. Thus competition among governments encompassed by fixed boundaries is not sufficient to eliminate those governments' monopoly power.
For an intuitive understanding of why jurisdictional competition does not eliminate governmental power, consider the following simplified version of the model. Suppose consumers get no utility from government services. Obviously, then, the bureaucratic monopolist will set G = 0. The condition determining the profit-maximizing value of t is then (1 3a) with G = 0. Suppose further that 0 and -r are constant over the relevant range. Then (13a) can be solved for t to yield:
Taking the limit of (15) as -r -> -ox, it is seen that:
Thus, when housing demand is perfectly elastic, the profitmaximizing tax rate is determined solely by the elasticity of housing supply independent of the number of jurisdictions. With perfectly elastic housing demand, the price of housing is exogenous, but bureaucratic monopolists can still profit by sharing in the rents of the landowners whose land is confined to some given jurisdiction. Alternatively, suppose that housing is in perfectly elastic supply. Then, An increase in the number of jurisdictions does monotonically decrease the tax rate. While these results are surprising, they are easily explained. The goverinmen-t of each jurisdiction is given the exclusive right to tax the property in that jurisdiction. Since boundaries are fixed, a landowner cannot move his land to another jurisdiction by a redefinition of boundaries. Fixity of boundaries prevents the tax on land from being competed away. Jurisdictions compete for residents, and competition among a large number of jurisdictions prevents exploitation of the elasticity of housing demand. Jurisdictions in our model here do not compete for land; consequently, the existence of a large number of jurisdictions does not prevent exploitation of the elasticity of housing supply.
Although the tax exploits only the elasticity of supply when there are many jurisdictions, one should not conclude that the tax merely redistributes wealth from landowners to bureaucrats. The tax reduces the unit price of housing received by suppliers, thereby reducing the supply of housing relative to the no-tax equilibrium. As a result, the gross-of-tax price of housing must be higher and per capita housing consumption lower than in the no-tax equilibrium. The only exception would be if housing supply were perfectly inelastic. For this case, the tax would not affect housing production or consumption.
Our results can be illustrated geometrically if we consider a simplified version of the model in which G is fixed at zero for all jurisdictions. Each curve in the right-hand portion of figure 1 shows combinations of net-of-tax housing prices and tax rates that generate the same gross-of-tax price and hence the same level of utility. The further to the northeast, the lower is the utility level. Let VO represent the highest utility attainable, that level which would occur if t = to = 0 inl all jurisdictions and competitive market forces determined a netof-tax price of Po. The housing market is depicted in the left-hand diagram. Recall that the housing-supply function per unit of land, h8, is independent of the number of jurisdictions and of the tax rate. The housing-demand function per unit of land is a product of the housing demand per person, hd[PH(l t),G], and the population density, 6. Hence each jurisdiction exhibits the same housing price, PO, and the same population density, 60. The zero tax equilibrium in the housing market is shown as point Z. Now consider the situation in which all governments set the same positive tax rate, tO. We show that this lowers utility and results in a Finally, the tax base per unit of land, with t = t', is found as the area OP1Xh14. Now, suppose the points X and Y represent the equilibrium when there are many jurisdictions. We illustrate why it would not be in the interest of any of these jurisdictions to unilaterally depart from this equilibrium. We then illustrate why it would be in the interest of a monopoly jurisdiction to choose a higher tax rate.
Suppose a competitive jurisdiction, say jurisdiction 1, were to unilaterally choose a tax rate, say, t2 > t1.14 Given residential mobility, the utility level cannot differ across jurisdictions. Thus, the gross-of-tax price in jurisdiction 1, PI(1 + t2), would equal PjW(1 + t'), which implies P2 < P1. Consequently, fewer housing units would be supplied in jurisdiction 1. To restore equilibrium in the housing market, it would be necessary for some residents to move to other jurisdictions, lowering the population density in jurisdiction 1, say, to 81 < 8O. The new hypothetical equilibrium for jurisdiction 1 is illustrated by points S and T. Since it contains but a small fraction of the area's land and population, migration out ofjurisdiction I would have no effect on the remaining jurisdictions. Thus, the hypothetical equilibrium for the remainingjurisdictions remains at pointsX and Y.
By increasing its tax rate, jurisdiction 1 decreases its tax base per unit of land to OP' Sh2. Should the percentage decline in the tax base be greater than the percentage increase in the tax rate (as suggested by fig. 1) , it would not be in the jurisdiction's interest to increase its tax rate. Similarly, were any one jurisdiction to reduce its tax rate below t2, the resulting increase in the tax base would be more than offset by the decline in the tax rate. Consequently, points X and Y describe the equilibrium for competitive jurisdictions, because there are no incentives for any of the economic agents, governments, residents, or housing suppliers to alter their behavior. Note that, in equilibrium, there are tax revenues collected by each jurisdiction, even when G = 0; jurisdictional competition is not sufficient to eliminate government profit.
Note that any jurisdiction's incentive to change its tax rate, and hence the equilibrium tax rate, depends on the elasticity of the h, function. The lower is this elasticity, the greater is the incentive to raise the tax rate. This result can be indicated by considering the case in which h, is completely inelastic; in particular, assume that h, rises vertically through point X. If any jurisdiction were to increase its tax rate, any decline in housing demand would not cause a loss of housing units; hence the jurisdiction's tax revenue would increase as long as the percentage increase in the tax rate, I\t/t, is greater than the percentage decline in the net-of-tax price, APHIPH-Since gross-of-tax price is constant, (PH -APH)(O + t + At) = PH(l + t), and consequently \PH/IPH = At/(1 + t + zAt) < At/t. A similar incentive to increase t would face each jurisdiction, and t would be continuously forced higher. By altering the supply curve through point X, we can easily show that the incentive to raise t decreases with an increase in the supply elasticity and that a sufficient increase in elasticity creates an incentive to lower the competitive equilibrium tax rate.
Next, suppose that the metropolitan area has but one monopoly jurisdiction. Also assume that the tax rate was initially set att1 and that the housing market and utility configurations were initially described by points X and Y. If the monopolist were to choose a higher tax rate, such as t2, this would increase the tax revenue per unit of land, unlike the situation for the single competitive jurisdiction, because residents cannot escape the monopolist by moving to other jurisdictions. Popu-lation density throughout the monopolist's jurisdiction would be unchanged at 80. An increase in the tax rate to t2 has two effects. First, assuming momentarily that the net-of-tax price is unchanged at Pj', the per capita demand for housing declines, sincePj1(1 + t2) >Pj(1 + t0). But with population density fixed at 80, this implies an excess supply of housing. Consequently, the second effect is that the netof-tax price must fall, say toP3. The resulting situation is depicted as points M and N. Note, though, that the decline in the monopolist's tax base per unit of land, to OP3MhO, is substantially smaller than the decline previously indicated for a competitive jurisdiction contemplating the same tax rate increase. Thus, the monopoly jurisdiction would find it profitable to increase its tax rate, even though a competitive jurisdiction would not. Assuming tax revenue changes nonotonically with the number of jurisdictions, it follows that tax revenue per unit of land, hence total tax revenue, is inversely related to the number of jurisdictions. With G fixed, government profit is also inversely related to the number of jurisdictions.
IV. Differing Objectives among Governments
As we indicated in the Introduction, data for local jurisdictions have been used extensively for empirical studies of models of government. The implicit presumption of these studies is that competition among jurisdictions does not prevent different governments from pursuing different goals or prevent them from offering different tax and service packages. In this section, we demonstrate that this presumption is correct. In so doing, we provide a theoretical justification for viewing local jurisdictions as natural laboratories for studying models of government. At the same time, we demonstrate that interdependence among local jurisdictions should not be ignored when such studies are conducted. Finally, results in this section make it clear that our result in the preceding section, that competition does not prevent governmental exercise of monopoly power, is not an artifact of our assumption of homogeneous governmental objectives.
As in the preceding section, we assume that an equilibrium exists, and we characterize the properties of that equilibrium as the number of jurisdictions becomes large. It is first necessary to derive the comparative static properties of an equilibrium in which tax and service packages differ across jurisdictions. Conditions (1) through (7) still obtain. The comparative static responses of prices in all jurisdictions to a change in the tax rate in an arbitrarily chosen jurisdiction can be derived from equations (8). There areJ equations in (8) from which theJ expressions &Pi/0t1 can be derived. The derivation differs from that employed in Section II only in that jurisdictions are not assumed to adopt identical tax-service packages in equilibrium. By similarly perturbing G in some arbitrarily chosen jurisdiction, say, 1, we can derive the] expressions for aPi/aG1. Thus, just as in Section II, comparative static responses of price in each jurisdiction to changes in its own fiscal variables and to changes in other jurisdictions' tax rates and service levels can be derived.
By investigating the limiting properties of these comparative statics, we find that, when the number of jurisdictions in a particular subarea becomes very large, the level of utility of residents of any of these jurisdictions is invariant to its choice of tax rate or level of government services. The amount of land in any of these jurisdictions is very small relative to both the total land area and to the land area of jurisdictions having the same amenity level. Consequently, the number of residents migrating into or out of any one of these jurisdictions in response to a change in its tax rate or level of government services is too small to affect the price of housing elsewhere. Hence, utility does not change elsewhere. Rather, the migration induces an adjustment of the housing price within the jurisdiction and that adjustment ensures that the level of utility within the jurisdiction continues to equal the utility level available elsewhere. By contrast, if a jurisdiction has a nonnegligible share of the land in the metropolitan area, migration induced by a change in its fiscal variables is sufficient to change housing prices and utility in all jurisdictions.
While an individual government cannot affect the equilibrium level of utility of its residents when the number of jurisdictions is large, tax rates and service levels are not similarly constrained. Whether changes in these variables are desirable depends upon the government objectives pursued, but it is clear that local governments have latitude in choosing these variables. Put differently, the "market" for local public goods does not force the government to act as a "tax rate taker."'5 This is illustrated in figure 1. Suppose that there are a large number of jurisdictions each of which occupies a small fraction of the land in the metropolitan area. Let V be the level of utility realized in equilibrium in all jurisdictions. Consider two of thesejurisdictions and assume, for simplicity of illustration, that both offer the same level of government services, G. The jurisdictions offer differing tax rates, t' and t2, but residents of both jurisdictions enjoy the same level of utility, V (shown by the equilibrium points Y and T), and the same 15 Each of the many jurisdictions faces the constraints as described by (dPk/dtl) = (dPh/dGI) = 0 and by eqq. (1), (2), and (4). If one, and perhaps only one, of these jurisdictions should be a profit-maximizing jurisdiction, as defined in the previous section, it is relatively easy to show that such a jurisdiction would choose its fiscal variables such that conditions (14) are attained. Hence, choice of / and G by profit maximization is not inconsistent with jurisdictional competition. gross-of-tax price as all other residents of the metropolitan area. In this equilibrium, jurisdiction 2 has a higher tax rate, a lower net-of-tax price, and a smaller population than jurisdiction 1.
By holding the tax rate constant, jurisdictions offering different levels of government services can be illustrated by a diagram similar to that in figure 1. The diagram would differ only in that G would replace t on the right-hand quadrant, and indifference curves would slope upward. Jurisdictions offering high levels of G would attract more residents than jurisdictions offering low levels of G. As a result, the price of housing would be higher in jurisdictions offering higher levels of government services. Competition will require that utility be the same in all jurisdictions, but equality of utility across jurisdictions does not require equality of tax rates or equality of levels of government services.
The finding that, in equilibrium, utility of residents of ajurisdiction is independent of its government's fiscal decisions is a startling result, one which highlights an important conceptual distinction between residents of a jurisdiction and its landowners. For residents who rent housing, the choices of tax rate and government spending level are matters of complete indifference in equilibrium. Housing prices will adjust to maintain their equilibrium utility level. By contrast, the wealth of landowners is directly affected by the choice of tax rates and level of government service. A resident landowner would clearly support a governmental objective of property value maximization. Such an objective would maximize the wealth of the resident as landowner, and, given his mobility, it would not diminish his utility as a consumer of government services and housing.
The results in this section also have implications for tests of the Tiebout hypothesis. In proposing his test of the Tiebout hypothesis, Oates (1969) argued that differences in tax rates or in the level of public services provided would be capitalized in housing prices. Edel and Sclar (1974) argued precisely the opposite-that in a long-run Tiebout equilibrium, tax rates and government spending levels would be uncorrelated with housing prices. In the model developed here, Oates's interpretation is clearly correct. In equilibrium, differences in tax rates and levels of government services will result in differences in housing prices across jurisdictions. This result does not depend on the existence of a large number ofjurisdictions, nor does it depend on the objectives being pursued by individual governments.16 The test proposed by Oates may be interpreted as a test of equilibrium condition (4). In equilibrium, with homogeneous residents, the maximum utility level individuals can achieve will be the same everywhere. Denote this utility level V. Setting V[Gi,Pi(l + tP)] = V and solving for Pi, we obtain an equation of the form estimated by Oates:
In any given equilibrium, V is the same across jurisdictions, and hence it is impounded in the constant term in a regression equation. To empirically test this equation, it is necessary that one have observations on at least two jurisdictions. However, the equation holds regardless of the number of jurisdictions. The above result and results in our previous paper (Epple, Zelenitz, and Visscher 1978) indicate the crucial role of assumptions about movability of jurisdictional boundaries. In our earlier paper, we argued that housing prices must necessarily be equal across jurisdictional boundaries when boundaries can be costlessly redrawn. By that argument, the hypothesis of Edel and Sclar is correct, but Oates's hypothesis is correct when boundaries are fixed exogenously.17
When the number of jurisdictions is large, changes by any one jurisdiction have no effect on V. Thus, when the number of jurisdictions is large, differentiation of (20) provides equations that correctly indicate the marginal change in the net-of-tax price of housing which will compensate residents when their jurisdiction changes its tax rate or service level. When the number of jurisdictions is small, a change by any one jurisdiction affects V. In that case, the appropriate expression for the price derivatives cannot be deduced from equation (20), and, as a result, the compensating alteration in housing price caused by a change in tax rate or service level cannot be deduced from (20).
V. Jurisdictions Differentiated by Size and Location
In preceding sections we considered models in which land at all locations is identical and jurisdictions are identical in size. In this 17 Note again that the test proposed by Oates is a test of equilibrium condition (4). If individuals are costlessly mobile among jurisdictions, if individuals have full information concerning jurisdictions' alternative fiscal environments, and if jurisdictions do not restrict residents' consumption bundles, then, as Oates clearly saw, equilibrium condition (4) obtains. This is not, however, a test of Tiebout's hypothesis. The latter is a normative statement, concerning the achievement of an amount of the public good, G, which maximizes individuals' utilities. As is clear from the analysis in the paper, there is no assurance that the utility-maximizing level of G is attained for any individual.
section we generalize the model to permit jurisdictions to differ in both size and degree of desirability. We argue that our preceding results concerning competition hold when jurisdictions are differentiated by desirability of location. We also discuss how the presence of a large number of small jurisdictions in one part of the metropolitan area affects the monopoly power of a large jurisdiction in the same metropolitan area. Finally, we discuss the effects of permitting new jurisdictions to form at the urban fringe.
Since the method of analysis required here is similar to that employed in previous sections, our discussion is presented without benefit of explicit mathematical argument or proof. Technical details are available on request.
To investigate the effects of differentiation of locations, we assume that the total land area Li is divided into K subareas or locations indexed by k. Each subarea has amenity (or accessibility) in amount Ask Variable A is assumed to enter the utility function directly. This specification permits investigation of the effects of varying either the number of jurisdictions at each location or the number of distinct locations. Equilibrium conditions analogous to (2) through (7) continue to apply. Differences are that amenity level now appears in the utility and demand functions. In addition, supply and demand for housing must be equilibrated at each location. Comparative static results are derived by the same procedure used to obtain equations (9), (10), and (11), and governmental objectives are studied using the approach employed in Sections III and IV.
The implications of increasing the number of jurisdictions offering a given amenity level are found to be similar to those derived in Section III. The presence of a large number of small jurisdictions offering the same amenity level prevents any one of these jurisdictions from exploiting the elasticity of housing demand but not the elasticity of housing supply. The profit-maximizing tax rate for these jurisdictions converges to the inverse of the housing-supply elasticity, a result analogous to that in (18) . Tax revenue per unit of land will be higher in locations with a high A, because the price of housing will be higher at such locations. This is a consequence of the equilibrium condition requiring utility to be constant across jurisdictions.
The presence of a large number of small jurisdictions in one part of the metropolitan area, however, does not prevent a large jurisdiction in another part of the metropolitan area from exploiting both the elasticity of housing demand and supply-a result analogous to that in (15).
To interpret these results, think of two locations in a metropolitan region, one the central city and the other the suburban area. The above results imply that a large number of jurisdictions in the suburban region are sufficient to prevent individual suburbs from exploiting the elasticity of housing demand. But the relatively large proportion of metropolitan land area occupied by the central city enables its bureaucratic monopolist to exploit the elasticity of housing demand, even if there are a large number of jurisdictions in the suburban region.
Instead of hypothesizing an increase in the number of jurisdictions offering a given amenity level, we might argue that each jurisdiction encompasses land with unique attributes. The implications of increasing the number of distinct jurisdictions occupying a fixed land area are found to be the same as those derived in Section III. The presence of a large number of small jurisdictions, even if each offers a unique amenity, is sufficient to prevent any jurisdiction from exploiting the elasticity of housing demand but not the elasticity of housing supply.
Finally, it might be argued that our results in Section III arise because we assumed a fixed amount of land available for urban use. This conjecture is incorrect. To demonstrate this point, suppose that locations are indexed in order of decreasing desirability, so that jurisdiction K has the lowest amenity level of the existing jurisdictions. Land with amenity level A,+i may then be thought of as the urban fringe, which we assume to be in perfectly elastic supply. With these assumptions, the utility that can be achieved by choosing land with amenity level AK+l is constant at, say, U.
There are two possible equilibria. All individuals may find the existing K jurisdictions more attractive than the urban fringe. In that case, the urban fringe is uninhabited and all results are unchanged. Alternatively, some individuals may live on the urban fringe. Since all individuals must achieve the same level of utility in equilibrium, the utility level throughout the metropolitan area is U. However, as demonstrated in Sections III and IV, an entrenched government that must provide its residents an exogenously specified level of utility can still profit by exploiting the elasticity of housing supply. The existence of jurisdictions at the extensive margin does not eliminate land rents in inframarginal jurisdictions, nor does it prevent the taxation of those rents. Therefore, regardless of which outcome occurs, jurisdictional competition, even when residents can relocate on the urban fringe, cannot prevent an entrenched government from exercising monopoly power.
In summary, by the introduction of heterogeneous urban locations, we demonstrate new results and establish that the results of Sections III and IV hold in a much more general setting. Whether the focus be on one urbanized area in isolation or on all urbanized areas within a nation, whenever rents exist, jurisdictional competition does not prevent an entrenched government from expropriating part of those rents.
VI. Conclusions
The major finding of this paper is that competition among many local jurisdictions is not sufficient to prevent local governments from exercising monopoly power. While we have derived this finding in a model in which government revenues are raised via property taxes, the result also follows if communities are empowered to levy a sales tax (i.e., a tax on the numeraire commodity), an income tax, or a combination of these three taxes. 18 The feature of our model that is primarily responsible for this result is the assumption of fixed jurisdictional boundaries.19 A government given taxing powers in a jurisdiction with fixed boundaries can exploit the immobility of land and share in the rents accruing to that land. Mobility of residents across a large number of jurisdictions can prevent individual governments from exploiting the elasticity of housing demand but not the elasticity of housing supply.
These results vindicate researchers seeking to develop a positive political theory of local government behavior. Jurisdictional competition does not predetermine the outcome; Tiebout does need politics. On the other hand, these results highlight the importance of considering the economic as well as the political environment of local governments. As shown in Section IV, competition among a large number of jurisdictions establishes constraints on the choices made by individual governments. Such constraints should not be ignored in modeling decision making by local governments.
